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SHAREHOLDER VOICE AND THE MARKET
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
PETER V. LETSOU*
The standard form for publicly held corporations provides sharehold-
ers with very limited powers. Shareholders can elect and remove direc-
tors, ' vote to amend, adopt, or repeal bylaws,2 and exercise a veto power
over fundamental corporate changes proposed by the corporation's board
of directors, such as charter amendments, 3 mergers and consolidations,4
sales of substantially all the corporation's assets,5 and liquidations.6 As a
general rule, however, the standard form does not permit shareholders to
control corporate business decisions.7 In fact, shareholder efforts to alter
the standard corporate form in order to provide themselves with a
greater voice in the management of a corporation's business have some-
times been invalidated by the courts.'
Standard economic explanations for rules limiting shareholder power
to control corporate business decisions9 focus on the economic function
of the corporate form and the collective action problems which arise
when each shareholder owns only a small fraction of a corporation's
stock. Dean Manne suggested in an early work ° that limitations on the
power of shareholders to control corporate business decisions should not
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University; B.A., Harvard University, 1983;
J.D., University of Chicago, 1986. I wish to thank Barry E. Adler, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Daniel Keat-
ing, Robert Rasmussen, Larry E. Ribstein, and participants at a faculty workshop at George Mason
University School of Law for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Financial
support from the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 211, 214, 216 (1990).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1990).
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c) (1990).
4. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1990).
5. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1990).
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (1990).
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1990).
8. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 77 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y.
1948) (agreement divesting directors of the power to run the corporation held invalid).
9. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1990) (delegating authority to make business deci-
sions to the corporation's board of directors).
10. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259
(1967).
Washington University Open Scholarship
756 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
be surprising because the public corporation is designed primarily to fa-
cilitate specialization of the tasks of owning and managing."' More re-
cent scholarship by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel takes a
slightly different view of rules that limit shareholders from exercising
voting control over business matters. 12 Starting with the proposition that
contracting costs make it impossible for shareholders and managers to
write contracts covering all contingencies that might arise during a cor-
poration's life, 3 Easterbrook and Fischel contend that voting provides a
mechanism by which shareholders can fill gaps in their contract with the
managers of the corporation.14 Given this function of shareholder vot-
ing, there is no a priori reason why shareholders would not want to retain
the right to make business decisions for the firm; however, Easterbrook
and Fisehel conclude that, because voting is expensive, shareholders
might rationally delegate their right to control such decisions to elected
directors.
Recently, however, both the rules that limit shareholder control over
corporate business decisions and the theoretical justifications that under-
lie those rules have come under fire. For example, many are now calling
for reforms that would give shareholders greater opportunities to partici-
pate in the process of setting executive pay.15 And these calls for reform
have struck a responsive chord in the United States Congress, where Sen-
ator Carl Levin is sponsoring the 1991 Corporate Pay Responsibility
Act, 6 and at the Securities and Exchange Commission, where Commis-
sion Chairman Richard Breeden recently announced proposed rules re-
quiring public corporations to give shareholders the right to vote on
advisory proposals dealing with executive compensation.1 7
At the same time, several commentators have challenged the tradi-
tional justifications for limitations on shareholder voice. Professor Black
11. Id. at 261; see also Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the
Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 383 (1983).
12. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
401-03 (1983).
13. For a discussion of the costs involved in writing detailed contracts, see Clifford W. Smith,
Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON.
117 (1979).
14. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 401-02.
15. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Recession Puts a Harsh Spotlight on Hefty Pay of Top Executives, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al.
16. S. 1198, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
17. See Breeden Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, 24 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 223 (Feb. 21, 1992).
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has argued that traditional law and economics scholarship underesti-
mates the potential benefits of shareholder activism because that scholar-
ship "assumes a stylized model of the large public corporation as having
thousands of shareholders, each owning a tiny fraction of its shares." 18
And Professor Gordon has gone one step further, suggesting that tradi-
tional justifications for rules limiting shareholder voice show only that
shareholders could ordinarily be expected to delegate most business deci-
sions to management, but fail to show why shareholders would not retain
a concurrent (albeit infrequently exercised) power to control corporate
business decisions.19
Given these developments, the time seems ripe for a fresh look at stan-
dard corporate law rules that limit shareholder control over business de-
cisions. This article undertakes that task, concluding that rules limiting
shareholder power to direct corporate business decisions do increase
shareholder wealth in some firms. However, this article contends that
existing economic theories fail to provide an adequate basis for rules re-
stricting shareholder voice. In place of existing explanations, this article
offers a new theory: that rules limiting shareholder power to control cor-
porate business decisions must ultimately rest upon the previously unex-
plored link between rules limiting shareholder voice in management, on
the one hand, and the efficient operation of the market for corporate con-
trol and organized securities exchanges, on the other.
Part I examines in greater detail the role of shareholders in public cor-
porations. In particular, Part I explores the power of shareholders to
influence, both directly and indirectly, the business affairs of the corpora-
tion. Although Part I focuses on state law, federal law--especially the
Securities and Exchange Commission's interpretation of its shareholder
proposal rule-is also analyzed.
18. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 567 (1990).
Recent studies on ownership concentration appear to confirm Professor Black's observation that the
collective action problems associated with shareholder activism may not be as great as once thought.
See Carolyn K. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A Summary
of Economic Research at the Columbia Institutional Investor Project (unpublished paper presented at
the Conference on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, June 14, 1990); see also
Demsetz, supra note 11, at 387-90 (study showing that about 50% of large corporations fall into
owner-controlled category); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management
in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1969) ("[S]tockholdings are much more
highly concentrated, and shareholders much more likely to expect to participate in important corpo-
rate decisions, than is commonly assumed.").
19. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to
Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
758 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Part II critiques existing explanations for rules that limit shareholder
power over business decisions. Part II explores in more detail the stan-
dard economic explanations for rules that limit shareholder power. In
addition, Part II considers Professor Gordon's recent explanation of the
limitation on shareholder control over business decisions20 which focuses
on the potential pathologies in shareholder voting that greater share-
holder power would create.
Part III presents an alternative explanation for the limitations on
shareholder power to control business decisions based upon the link be-
tween shareholder voice in management, on the one hand, and the effi-
cient operation of the market for corporate control and organized
securities exchanges, on the other. Part III contends that rules limiting
shareholder control over business decisions increase shareholder wealth
in some firms by facilitating the efficient operation of organized securities
markets and the market for corporate control. Specifically, Part III ar-
gues, first, that rules limiting shareholder voice in management both re-
duce transaction costs incurred in connection with control transactions
and decrease the premium that bidders must pay to acquire control,
thereby facilitating the efficient operation of the market for corporate
control; and second, that rules limiting shareholder voice allow market
prices to impound additional information about firm value, thereby facili-
tating the efficient operation of organized securities exchanges. 2I
Finally, this article discusses the connection between the article's main
conclusion regarding the economic justification for rules that limit share-
holder voice and the current debate regarding the appropriate role for
institutional investors in corporate governance. 22 The concluding com-
20. See id.
21. In many respects, the justification for rules limiting shareholder voice presented in Part III
is similar to the justification for the doctrine of limited liability offered by Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel in Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985).
22. In contrast to their counterparts in Japan and Germany, institutional investors in the
United States have played a relatively passive role in corporate governance. See Louis Lowenstein &
Ira M. Millstein, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons from
Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 739. Mark Roe has argued that the passivity of institutional
investors in the United States results from legal rules that prevent certain types of institutions from
holding sufficiently large stakes in firms to make institutional activism economically feasible. Mark
J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991); see also
Black, supra note 18. The recognition that institutional shareholder passivity is not inevitable, com-
bined with evidence suggesting that public corporations have high levels of institutional ownership,
see Brancato, supra note 18, has led a number of commentators to consider the benefits and limita-
tions of institutional shareholder activism. See, eg., BERNARD S. BLACK, AGENTS WATCHING
AGENTS: THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER VOICE (The Center for Law and Economic
[Vol. 70:755
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ments suggest that changes to corporation laws designed to facilitate
monitoring of corporate managers by increasing shareholder influence
over business decisions should only be undertaken with caution.
Although such changes may increase the effectiveness of shareholder
monitoring of managers, this analysis suggests that such changes may
inadvertently decrease the effectiveness of a more important mechanism
for controlling corporate managers-the market for corporate control.
I. THE ROLE OF THE SHAREHOLDER IN CORPORATE
DECISIONMAKING
A. Shareholder Power to Direct Corporate Action
The starting point for an analysis of the shareholders' role in corporate
decisionmaking is state corporation law. All state corporation statutes
have roughly the same form. A board of directors elected by the share-
holders is given authority to manage the business and affairs of the cor-
poration,23 and shareholders are given the power to attend shareholders
meetings and to vote on proper business matters brought before those
meetings. 24 However, state corporation statutes provide only limited gui-
dance on the question of what constitutes "proper business" for a share-
holders meeting. Not surprisingly, this question has been subject to
substantial debate.25
Studies, Columbia University Working Paper No.52, Oct. 1991); John C. Coffee, Liquidity Versus
Controb" The Institutional investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors,
43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 89 (1990); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Share-
holder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991). While most view an increased role for institutions in
corporate governance as a positive development, some commentators remain skeptical. See, eg.,
Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial
Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1990).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211, 212 (1990).
25. Most of this debate has occurred in connection with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's nearly 50 year effort to define a "proper subject for shareholder action" for purposes of its
shareholder proposal rule. See, e.g., David C. Bayne, The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U.
DET. L.J. 575 (1957); Thomas M. Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade
Later, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 13 (1964); Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC
Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1952); John G. Ledes, A
Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 U. DET. L.J. 520 (1957); Henry G. Manne,
Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1972); Note, Proxy
Rule 14a-. Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1971); Note, Liberalizing
SEC Rule 14a-8 Through the Use of Advisory Proposals, 80 YALE L.J. 845 (1971). See generally
1992]
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Despite confusion over what constitutes a proper subject for share-
holder action at a shareholders meeting, controlling principles can be de-
rived from state corporation statutes and the cases and administrative
rulings interpreting those statutes. Most importantly, the applicable stat-
utes, cases, and rulings clearly demonstrate that shareholders lack power
to direct the corporation's managers to make specific business deci-
sions.26 For example, even assuming that shareholders owning a major-
ity of the corporation's shares agree to oppose the position of
management,27 the shareholders cannot direct the corporation to remove
Eisenberg, supra note 18. The Securities and Exchange Commission's shareholder proposal rule is
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1991).
26. See Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912); see also HARRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 188, at 491 (3d ed. 1983); Eisenberg,
supra note 18, at 5.
27. Recent studies suggest that convincing shareholders who own a majority of the corpora-
tion's shares to oppose the position of management is not an easy task. This is true even for share-
holders owning sufficiently large stakes in the firm to convince the firm's other shareholders that
they are motivated by a desire to increase the profitability of the firm, rather than by a desire to
benefit themselves at the firm's expense. These studies suggest that shareholders opposing manage-
ment face an uphill battle because of the inherent advantages of management in proxy contests. See
John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237
(1988) (presenting evidence that laws governing proxy solicitation give management a differential
vote-getting advantage, that conflicts of interest lead institutional investors to vote with management
even when doing so is contrary to their fiduciary interests, and that dissident shareholders are re-
garded with suspicion by other shareholders); see also James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure
and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988) (presenting evidence that
institutional investors that derive benefits from lines of business under management control are more
likely to support management than institutions that are less subject to management influence); cf.
Black, supra note 18, at 530-66 (surveying legal barriers to shareholder action). In light of the
advantages enjoyed by management in proxy contests, some have urged the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Commission" or "SEC") to revise its proxy rules so that dissident shareholders
can compete with management on a level playing field. See, eg., Letter from Ralph V. Whitworth,
Director, United Shareholders Association, to Johnathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Mar. 20, 1990) (SEC File No. S7-22-91) (calling on SEC to reform its proxy
rules to, among other things, require confidential proxy voting, increase shareholder access to the
corporation's proxy machinery, and reduce existing barriers to communication among sharehold-
ers); Letter from Richard H. Koppes, General Counsel, California Public Employees' Retirement
System, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Nov. 3, 1989) (SEC File No. S7-22-91). In response to these calls for reform, the
Commission announced in April, 1990 that it was undertaking a comprehensive review of its proxy
rules. See Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at
the Council of Institutional Investors Annual Meeting (Apr. 2, 1990). Pursuant to that review, the
Securities and Exchange Commission proposed a first series of proxy rule amendments on June 17,
1991. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-29,315 (June 17, 1991). After receiving more than 600
comment letters, the SEC announced on November 20, 1991 that it would revise its proposals. See
SEC to Revise Proxy Proposals on Shareholder Communications, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
46, at 1669 (Nov. 22, 1991).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/3
SHAREHOLDER VOICE: MARKET FOR CONTROL
an officer, nor can they direct the board to cause the corporation to ex-
pand into new lines of business.
The shareholders' inability to direct corporate action results from two
basic characteristics of state corporation law: first, state corporation stat-
utes expressly confer the power to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation to the board of directors; and second, state corporation stat-
utes confer no analogous power on the shareholders. The silence of state
corporation law regarding shareholder power to direct corporate action,
however, is not conclusive because shareholders, as owners, could argua-
bly exercise an "inherent power" to direct corporate action (at least in
states where the delegation to the board of directors is not expressly des-
ignated in the corporation statute as an exclusive delegation).2" But the
proposition that shareholders possess such inherent power finds little
support in the cases. At best, the cases suggest that the shareholders'
inherent power to direct corporate action is limited to matters closely
connected with the basic rights expressly granted to shareholders under
the state corporation law. Thus, although shareholders may have the
inherent power to remove a director for cause,29 to fill newly created
directorships between annual meetings, 0 and to require the corporation
to issue certain types of reports,a" they do not have the inherent power to
direct management to make specific business decisions on matters such as
28, Cf. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 86-87 (1976) (sug-
gesting that shareholders may have "inherent powers" in addition to the legal powers expressly
conferred on them by the state corporation statute); see also Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 589 (1933)
(holding that shareholders have the inherent authority to amend corporation bylaws, reasoning that
"[i]t would be preposterous to leave the real owners of the corporate property at the mercy of their
agents").
29. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. 1957) (concluding that shareholders have
an implied power to remove directors for cause); Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954)
(explaining that stockholders who have the power to elect directors can also remove them for cause).
30. See Gold Bluff Mining & Lumber Corp. v. Whitlock, 55 A. 175 (Conn. 1903); Burr v. Burr
Corp., 291 A.2d 409 (Del. Ch. 1972); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. 1957); Auto-
matic Steel Prods., Inc. v. Johnston, 64 A.2d 416 (Del. Super. Ct. 1949). For additional citations,
see EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 86 n.5.
31, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948);
cf. Clusserath, supra note 25, at 45-46. In addition to the inherent powers discussed in the text,
shareholders may also have the inherent power to create mechanisms to monitor management busi-
ness decisions more effectively. For instance, shareholders may have the inherent right to require
the appointment of independent auditors. Transamerica, 163 F.2d at 516-17; cf. Clusserath, supra
note 25, at 45-46. Shareholders may also have the inherent right to establish shareholder advisory
committees to work with and more closely monitor the performance of management. See, eg.,
Exxon Corporation, SEC No-Action Letters, Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 030992020 (Feb. 28,
1992).
1992]
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hiring a new chief executive officer or closing an aging factory.
32
That shareholders lack power to adopt binding resolutions that direct
management to take specific actions with respect to corporate property
does not automatically mean, however, that shareholders lack power to
influence the corporation's business affairs. To establish the broader
proposition, that shareholders lack power to influence the corporation's
day-to-day business decisions, one must show that the powers granted to
shareholders under state corporation laws are not close substitutes for a
general power to direct corporate action. More concretely, one must
show that the shareholders' state law powers33 cannot be utilized by
shareholders to force the corporation to adopt a course of action not
favored by management.
The following subsections of this Part undertake that analysis. Con-
sidering each of the shareholders' basic state law powers in turn, the pa-
per concludes that-at least in the case of corporations where a single
shareholder (or group of related shareholders) fails to hold a controlling
interest 34 in the firm3 5-none of the state law powers gives the sharehold-
32. Cf. Clusserath, supra note 25, at 22 (citing instance in which the SEC held that sharehold-
ers lacked the power to vote on a proposal directing management to study the benefits of an acquisi-
tion program aimed at diversifying the corporation's activities).
33. For example, the power to elect and remove directors, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 141, 211, 214, 216 (1990), the power to vote to amend, adopt or repeal bylaws, see, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, 109(a) (1990), the power to veto fundamental corporate transactions, see, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c) (1990) (charter amendments); § 251(c) (mergers and consolida-
tions); § 271(a) (sales of all, or substantially all, of a corporation's assets); § 275(b) (voluntary disso-
lution), and the power to vote on certain proposals recommending specific corporate action to the
board of directors (even though state corporation law expressly places authority to make the final
decision regarding the particular issue in the board of directors), see Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d
590 (N.Y. 1954); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1991) (SEC shareholder proposal rule).
34. A shareholder who owns 51% of a corporation's common stock will generally have the
power to control the affairs of the corporation. However, where share ownership is dispersed among
a large number of passive investors, de facto control may be lodged in much smaller blocks of stock.
See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BusINEsS ASSOCIATIONS 987 (2d ed. 1990) (citing BARCLAY & HOLDER-
NESS, THE LAW AND LARGE-BLOCK TRADES (Managerial Economics Research Center, William E.
Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester Working Paper No.
89-17, Sept. 1989) (presenting evidence that, where ownership is sufficiently diffuse, a holder of 5-
10% of common stock may have substantial control)).
35. A shareholder may not want to acquire a controlling interest for a number of reasons.
First, the shareholder may not have access to the financing necessary to acquire a controlling interest
in the firm. Second, because acquisition of control involves significant transaction costs, the benefits
of acquiring control may not be great enough to justify the costs. Finally, holders of control are
subject to significant legal restrictions, such as prohibitions on insider trading and short-swing trad-
ing under §§ 10(b) and 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78p(b)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/3
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ers any significant ability to influence the corporation's business
decisions.
B. The Right to Elect Directors
All state corporation statutes grant the shareholders the right to nomi-
nate and elect directors to manage the corporation's affairs.3 6 Accord-
ingly, by nominating and electing a slate of directors that supports their
position, shareholders may attempt to force the corporation to adopt an
alternative business plan. Although this approach is clearly available to
shareholders under state law,3 7 it is not an attractive option.
First, many state corporation statutes severely restrict shareholder
power to call special shareholders meetings.38 Therefore, shareholders
may have to wait until the corporation's next annual meeting to present
and vote on proposals to replace the corporation's board of directors. If
the meeting is sufficiently far in the future, the course of action advocated
by the shareholders may no longer be available to the corporation.
Second, replacing the board of directors with directors that support
the shareholders' position may be impractical when the corporation has a
classified board of directors.39 If a board is classified to the fullest extent
permitted by law, it may take two years for the shareholders to replace a
majority of the board.' During this period, management will be able to
cause the corporation to pursue the course of action that it prefers, with-
(1988), and rules imposing liability on "controlling persons" for securities laws violations, see 15
U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t(a) (1988). See generally Black, supra note 18.
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 211, 214, 216 (1990).
37. Id. Although shareholders clearly have the power under state law to propose candidates
for the corporation's board of directors, they lack the power to force management to include such
proposals in management's proxy materials. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1991) (permitting
management to omit shareholder proposals relating to an election to office). Thus, shareholders who
want to propose and solicit proxies for the election of a slate of directors not favored by incumbent
management must do so at their own expense.
38. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (1990) (giving the board of directors the exclu-
sive power to call special shareholder meetings unless the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws
provides otherwise).
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1990) (permitting a corporation's board of
directors to be divided into one, two, or three classes).
40. For example, if a corporation has a board of directors divided into three classes, only one-
third of the directors will be elected at any annual shareholders meeting. Although the dissident
shareholder might try to replace a majority of the members of the board by seeking to remove other
directors before their term in office expires, this effort is not likely to succeed. As a general rule,
shareholders may only remove a member of a classified board of directors for cause. See, eg., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1990).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
764 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
out regard to shareholder complaints. Consequently, by the time direc-
tors who support the shareholders' position constitute a majority of the
board of directors, pursuit of the course of action advocated by the share-
holders may be impractical. For instance, it may be impossible to reverse
the prior board's actions or the opportunity that the shareholders wished
to pursue may no longer be available.
Third, even assuming both that a meeting can be held in a timely fash-
ion and that it is possible to remove a majority of the corporation's board
of directors at a single shareholders' meeting, owners of a majority of the
firm's shares may be unwilling to remove the entire board of directors.
Even though the shareholders may prefer an alternative course of action
on a particular issue, they may not be willing to oust an otherwise satis-
factory management over a single business issue, especially if the eco-
nomic significance of the issue is limited.
Finally, a proxy contest for control of the board of directors is likely to
be very expensive for the shareholders leading the challenge. Because a
proxy contest for control represents a direct threat to the continued em-
ployment and influence of management, the incumbent managers will
devote considerable resources to defend their positions.41 Faced with
these large expenditures by management, the shareholders challenging
management must either increase their own expenditures or accept a de-
creased probability that they will convince owners of a majority of the
shares to support them. Therefore, a proxy contest for control is only
likely to be a viable option in a small class of cases: those involving busi-
ness decisions having dramatic economic consequences for the firm.
Even then, evidence suggests that the shareholders' chance of success is
small.42
41. Liberal spending by incumbent managers is extremely likely because state corporation laws
permit managers to use corporate assets to defend their positions. In particular, incumbent directors
are allowed to use the corporate proxy statement at no expense to themselves to solicit votes from
the corporation's shareholders for a new term in office. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Access to the
Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1494-95 (1970).
42. For evidence that dissident shareholders generally fail to obtain a majority of board seats,
see Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN.
EcON. 401 (1983) (study of proxy contests from 1962 to 1978). However, dissident shareholders
often attain their objectives, even though they fail to capture a majority of board seats. See Harry
DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, 23
J. FIN. ECON. 29 (1989).
[Vol. 70:755
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/3
1992] SHAREHOLDER VOICE: MARKET FOR CONTROL
C. The Power to Adopt, Amend, and Repeal Bylaws
In addition to granting shareholders the right to elect and remove di-
rectors, most state corporation statutes grant shareholders the power to
adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws.4" Corporation statutes typically pro-
vide that bylaws may contain any provision relating to the business of the
corporation or the conduct of its affairs.' Therefore, it would appear
that shareholders could utilize the power to amend the corporation's by-
laws to force the board of directors to follow the particular business poli-
cies that the shareholders prefer.
The power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws, however, is not as
expansive as it appears. First, the shareholders generally share power
over the corporation's bylaws with the board of directors.4 Accord-
ingly, the shareholders' power over the bylaws is "constrained by the
board's ability to ... undercut, if not contradict, the shareholder mea-
sure." 46 Second, the corporate statutes that authorize the inclusion in
the bylaws of provisions relating to the business of the corporation also
require that all bylaws be consistent with state law and the corporate
charter.47 Thus, since state law provisions vesting authority to manage
the corporation's business in the board of directors are generally held to
bar shareholders from ordering the board of directors to follow particu-
lar practices and policies,4" bylaw amendments mandating specific busi-
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1990); see also Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933)
(concluding that shareholders have inherent authority to adopt and amend bylaws).
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1990); see also REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 2.06(b) (1984) ("The bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for managing the business
and regulating the affairs of the corporation ....").
45. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1990) (providing that the certificate of incorpo-
ration can confer the power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws upon the corporation's directors, but
clearly emphasizing that "[t]he fact that such power has been so conferred ... shall not divest the
stockholders ... of the power... to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws").
46. Gordon, supra note 19, at 350.
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1990); REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 2.06(b)
(1989). In several cases courts have stricken bylaw provisions on the grounds that they were incon-
sistent with the state corporation statute or with the corporate charter. See Automatic Steel Prods.,
Inc. v. Johnston, 64 A.2d 416 (Del. 1949); In re William Faehndrich, Inc., 141 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y.
1957) (bylaw provision regarding size of quorum invalid because it was not authorized by certificate
of incorporation); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 60 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1945) (bylaw requiring
directors to receive unamimous approval invalid as contrary to corporation law). For additional
cases, see HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 133, at 307 nn.3
& 4 (3d ed. 1983).
48. Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138 (N.Y. 1912) (shareholders can only make
requests or recommendations with respect to the management of the corporation); Associated Gro-
cers, Inc. v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ala. 1948) (holding that directors' authority to run
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ness decisions would likely be held invalid. 9 Finally, even assuming that
the shareholders could use the power to amend corporate bylaws to con-
trol corporate business decisions, the power is limited in its effectiveness
due to the shareholders' inability under the corporate law of many states
to call a special meeting at which the power could be exercised. 50
D. The Right to Approve Fundamental Corporate Changes
The final source of express shareholder authority is the power to vote
on fundamental corporate transactions. 51 Unlike the power to elect di-
rectors and the power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws, the right to
vote with respect to fundamental corporate transactions gives the share-
holders a direct voice in the firm's business decisions. Assuming, then,
that the course of action favored by management involves a "fundamen-
tal corporate transaction," shareholders can use their power to approve
the transaction to block management from pursuing its chosen course.
But while the power to vote on fundamental corporate transactions
clearly gives shareholders a voice in the corporation's business decisions,
that voice is extremely limited. Most importantly, shareholders can only
use the power to vote on fundamental transactions in connection with a
small class of business transactions-those that require charter amend-
ments or those that involve mergers, consolidations, or sales of all or
substantially all the corporation's assets. Although this list includes
some of the most economically significant transactions in the life of the
corporation, it does not include all business matters on which sharehold-
ers may wish to speak. Clearly, as a theoretical matter, some business
matters that do not constitute "fundamental corporate changes" under a
state's corporation law may involve gains or losses that are large enough
the corporation is controlling and exclusive); Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440 (App. Div. 1962)
(concluding that directors have the absolute authority to do any acts which pertain to the ordinary
business of the corporation). See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.1.1, at 94
(1986).
49. See Capitol Cab Coop. Ass'n v. Darden, 169 A.2d 463 (D.C. 1961) (striking down bylaw
that provided method for compensating counsel in a manner that restricted board's discretion);
Richford Industries, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 067502039 (Apr. 2,
1975) (proposal to amend bylaw dealing with directors' remuneration improper infringement on
duties of board); cf Donald E. Schwartz & Elliot J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder
Proposal Rule, 65 GEo. L.J. 635, 669-70 & nn.168-70 (1977).
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c) (1990) (charter amendments); § 25 1(c) (mergers
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to make feasible active oversight by shareholders.52
In addition, a determined management can often avoid the sharehold-
ers' right to vote on fundamental corporate transactions because state
corporation statutes frequently treat transactions of similar economic
substance differently. For instance, while state corporation statutes gen-
erally give shareholders the right to approve mergers or consolidations,
the laws often fail to provide voting rights for direct acquisitions of stock
or assets. 3 Therefore, a management determined to cause the corpora-
tion to merge with another firm can simply restructure the transaction as
a direct acquisition of the other firm's stock or assets if management de-
termines that its shareholders are not likely to vote to approve the
combination. 4
Finally, shareholder voice in business decisions provided by the right
to vote on fundamental corporate transactions is limited because the
right provided is only a veto power; it does not give shareholders the
power to initiate fundamental transactions.55 Thus, the right to vote on
fundamental corporate transactions only provides the shareholders with
the power to block management's proposed course of action; it does not
empower the shareholders to force the corporation to undertake a course
of action they prefer in place of the course of action preferred by
management.
E. Inherent Rights of Shareholders to Recommend Corporate Action
The shareholders' final source of authority lies in their purported abil-
52. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 415-16.
53. See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (no voting rights for acquiror's share-
holders when acquiror issues stock in exchange for all of target's assets, even though combination
had same economic effect as merger or consolidation). But see Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d
25 (Pa. 1958) (corporate combination accomplished by way of stock for assets exchange held to be de
facto merger for purposes of shareholder voting rights); see also Applestein v. United Board & Car-
ton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960) (accepting defacto merger doctrine), aff'd
per curiam, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1961).
54. For example, in 1989, Time Inc. restructured a proposed merger of Warner Communica-
tions into a subsidiary of Time (pursuant to which Warner shareholders would have received Time
common stock) as a cash tender offer for the common stock of Warner in order to avoid a New York
Stock Exchange rule which would have required Time to obtain approval for the merger from its
shareholders. However, the power of incumbent management to restructure the terms of a transac-
tion in order to avoid rules requiring a shareholder vote may be limited by case law. See, e.g., Aiple
v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 143 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1966) (invalidating an attempt to avoid
shareholder vote required to issue additional shares of stock by causing wholly owned subsidiary to
issue the shares).
55. See CLARK, supra note 48, § 9.3, at 378.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
768 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ity to make recommendations to the board of directors, even when those
recommendations deal with matters that state corporation law places
squarely within the jurisdiction of the board of directors. Accordingly,
shareholders may try to cause the corporation to engage in a particular
course of action by sponsoring and approving a precatory proposal ex-
pressing the shareholders' position.5 6 Although such a proposal would
not bind the board of directors, shareholders might expect the board to
hesitate to act contrary to the clearly expressed (albeit legally unenforce-
able) will of the corporation's owners. After all, a failure to act in ac-
cordance with the unambiguously expressed will of the shareholders
could lead to the ouster of the offending directors at the corporation's
next annual meeting.5 7
At first glance, the precatory proposal appears to offer shareholders a
more promising mechanism for exerting influence over corporate deci-
sions than the alternatives considered previously. However, closer analy-
sis of the legal basis for the shareholders' power to propose precatory
resolutions shows that this is not true. First, the shareholders' power to
propose precatory resolutions may not, in fact, exist under applicable
state corporation law.5 8 Second, even if the power exists, it may not ex-
tend very far into the realm of business decisions.
The power of shareholders under state corporation law to offer preca-
tory proposals is generally assumed,59 although the validity of the as-
sumption is debatable. Proponents of the shareholders' power to offer
precatory proposals generally rely upon the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Auer v. Dressel.6  In Auer, the petitioners sought to
56. Advisory proposals have generally been advanced by social activists. See Schwartz & Weiss,
supra note 49, at 642-48 (describing social proposals that have significantly impacted corporate
behavior). More recently, however, institutional investors have begun advancing advisory proposals
on corporate governance issues, such as confidential voting, poison pill defenses, and shareholder
advisory committees. See Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Cor-
porate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97 (1988).
57. The risk to managers who fail to follow shareholder advice has been noted elsewhere. See,
e.g., Ryan, supra note 56, at 112.
58. The state law power to make precatory proposals should not be confused with the Securities
and Exchange Commission's shareholder proposal rule. The latter permits shareholders to have
certain proposals included in management's proxy materials, provided that those proposals are per-
missible under state law. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1991).
59. See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1519; Ryan, supra note 56, at 119 n.81; Note, Proxy Rule
14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, supra note 25, at 708-09; Note, Liberalizing SEC Rule
14a-8 Through the Use of Advisory Proposals, supra note 25, at 852. But cf Manne, supra note 25
(suggesting that shareholder power to offer social proposals may be highly illusory).
60. 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954).
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compel the corporation's president to call a special shareholders meeting
to, among other things, permit the shareholders to vote on a proposal
endorsing the former president's administration of the firm and demand-
ing his reinstatement. Although the court recognized that the sharehold-
ers lacked the power to effect a change in the corporation's officers, it
nonetheless held that the precatory shareholder proposal was a proper
subject for a shareholders meeting.
The New York Court of Appeals holding in Auer clearly supports the
position of those favoring the shareholders' right to offer and vote on
precatory proposals. However, in rendering the opinion, the court
neither cited legal support nor offered theoretical justification for its con-
clusion that shareholders could offer precatory proposals where
mandatory proposals dealing with the same subject matter would be pro-
hibited. Instead, the court dealt with the issue in a single sentence, stat-
ing only that "there is nothing invalid in... [shareholders] expressing
themselves and thus putting on notice the directors who will stand for
election at the annual meeting. '61
The shortcomings of the majority's approach in Auer are manifest.
First, the shareholders' power to make precatory proposals appears to
conflict with one of the most basic provisions of corporation law. As
Justice Van Voorhis noted in his dissent: "For the stockholders to vote
on this proposition would be an idle gesture, since [state corporate law
provides] ... that 'The business of a corporation shall be managed by its
board of directors'. 62 Second, the premise that implicitly underlies the
majority's approach-that giving shareholders the power to make preca-
tory proposals will not alter the balance between managers and share-
holders-is flawed. Granting shareholders the power to make precatory
proposals at least in part shifts the power to set the corporate agenda to
the shareholders. Modem political theory clearly demonstrates that the
power to set the agenda is often equivalent to the power to control the
outcome.63 Thus, it would seem that proponents of the shareholders'
right to offer precatory proposals on matters that would not be proper for
shareholder action if phrased in mandatory language should offer more
than the Auer opinion if their position is to prevail.' 4
61. Id. at 593.
62. Id. at 594-95 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
63. See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
65-66 (1986).
64. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Auer decision has been rejected by at least one other state
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
770 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:755
But even assuming that shareholders have some power to make preca-
tory proposals under state corporate law, it remains unclear whether that
power extends to proposals that address specific business decisions or
whether it is limited to matters over which shareholders generally share
authority with the board of directors, such as charter amendments and
bylaw provisions. The Securities and Exchange Commission, which has
largely usurped the states' role in determining what constitutes a proper
subject for shareholder action under state law through the administration
of its shareholder proposal rule,6" has itself taken different positions on
the issue.
In its earliest interpretations of the shareholder proposal rule, the
Commission interpreted the power of shareholders to make advisory pro-
posals very broadly. In 1952, the Commission ruled that "proposals re-
lating to matters in those areas which are confined to management
exclusively under state law are held proper by the Commission, if they
are phrased as a request or recommendation that the board consider the
advisability of the action or procedure proposed by the stockholders."66
Not surprisingly, an early study of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's shareholder proposal rule illustrated that a significant number of
shareholder proposals related to ordinary business operations. 67 Most
supreme court. See Carter v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 362 P.2d 766 (Or. 1961) (refusing to permit
shareholders to vote on proposal opposing board of directors' decision to build dam where state law
plainly vests power of decision in the board).
65. The Securities and Exchange Commission's shareholder proposal rule requires that share-
holders provide management with copies of their proposals to be included in management's proxy
materials at least 120 days in advance of the date of management's proxy statement for the previous
year's annual meeting. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(3) (1991). If management wishes to omit the propo.
sal from its proxy statement on the ground that the proposal is not a proper subject for shareholder
action, it must file with the Commission a copy of the proposal, a statement of its reasons for omit-
ting the proposal, and a supporting opinion of counsel at least 80 days before copies of the definitive
proxy statement are mailed to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1991). The Commission staff
then determines whether or not management's proxy statement must include the shareholder propo-
sal.
For all practical purposes, the staff's determination of whether a shareholder proposal constitutes
a proper subject for shareholder action is final. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 49, at 648-53.
Distributing a proxy statement to shareholders that has not been approved by the Commission staff
risks antagonizing the Commission staff and exposing the corporation to a Commission enforcement
action. Moreover, seeking a declaratory judgment in court poses the risk that the corporation's
annual meeting may have to be delayed. For a discussion of the costs of litigating staff determina-
tions under Rule 14a-8, see Manne, supra note 25, at 495-99.
66. Harry Heller, Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DiCTA 72, 74 (1952-53) (emphasis
added).
67. Emerson & Latcham, supra note 25 (study of shareholder proposals included in proxy
statements during the years 1948-1951).
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notably, the study showed that, of the 286 shareholder proposals in-
cluded in the proxy statements examined, forty-five concerned executive
remuneration issues, such as suggestions for executive salary reductions,
executive bonuses, and executive retirement plans.
68
The Securities and Exchange Commission, however, quickly retreated
from its broad interpretation of the shareholders' power to make advi-
sory proposals. In 1954, the Commission amended its shareholder pro-
posal rule to provide that management could omit proposals
recommending or requesting action involving conduct of the corpora-
tion's ordinary business operations. 69 Although the Commission did not
define "ordinary business operations" in its amended rule, the Commis-
sion subsequently adopted the view that proposals relating to matters
within the board of director's exclusive authority involved "ordinary
business operations." 70 As a consequence of this interpretation of "ordi-
nary business operations," the Commission generally permitted corpora-
tions to exclude all advisory proposals related to the management of the
business and affairs of the corporation, without regard to the significance
or importance of the activity in the proposal.71 Therefore, during the
1950s and 1960s, shareholders had little, if any, power to make precatory
proposals that dealt with specific business decisions.72
The most recent shift in the Securities and Exchange Commission's
view on the power of shareholders to make precatory proposals regard-
ing the corporation's business decisions occurred in the early 1970s.
During this period, the Commission abandoned its earlier view equating
"ordinary business operations" with the scope of the board of directors
exclusive authority under state corporation law and instead adopted a
68. Id. at 821.
69. Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 19 Fed. Reg. 246 (Jan. 14, 1954). The current version of
the ordinary business operation's exclusion is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1991).
70. See Clusserath, supra note 25, at 34-36.
71. Thus, pursuant to its authority to exclude proposals relating to ordinary business opera-
tions, the Commission staff has permitted the exclusion of proposals relating to matters of considera-
ble economic importance. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994 (Dec. 3, 1976) (old interpretation of
shareholder proposal supported exclusion of proposal relating to construction of nuclear power
plant).
72. This is not to suggest that the power to make precatory proposals was unimportant during
the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, the power to make precatory proposals was generally used
by shareholders to make proposals in areas where shareholders shared authority with management,
such as bylaw and charter amendments. Without the power to make precatory proposals, share-
holders could not have raised these matters because state corporate law generally gives the board of
directors the exclusive power to initiate action in respect of bylaw and charter amendments.
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view of "ordinary business operations" which focused on the importance
to shareholders of the particular matter under consideration. This evolu-
tion in the interpretation of "ordinary business operations" began in 1972
when the Securities and Exchange Commission failed to assert, as a
grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court in Medical Committee for
Human Rights v. SEC,73 that a shareholder proposal regarding Dow
Chemical's production of napalm encompassed ordinary business opera-
tions.74 The evolution in the interpretation of "ordinary business opera-
tions" culminated with the Commission's adoption of the 1976
amendments to the shareholder proposal rule. In the release accompany-
ing those amendments, the Commission expressly stated that the ordi-
nary business operations exclusion could no longer be used to omit
proposals that involve "substantial policy or other considerations. ' 75 As
a result of this reinterpretation of the exclusion, the Commission staff
now permits some precatory proposals touching on a corporation's busi-
ness decisions.
An examination of both the Commission's no-action letters and court
decisions implementing the current Securities and Exchange Commission
policy on shareholder proposals illustrates, however, that the shareholder
proposal mechanism is still not very useful to shareholders whose pri-
mary motivation is to increase the economic value of their investment.
For the most part, courts and the Commission staff have found that a
proposal involves "substantial policy or other considerations" only when
the proposal concerns important questions of social policy, such as envi-
ronmental matters, 76 animal rights,7 7 the manufacture of tobacco prod-
UCtS, 78 and affirmative action.79  Proposals that deal with matters of
73. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
74. For a discussion of the significance of the failure of the Commission to assert various argu-
ments in its appeal of the Medical Committee decision to the United States Supreme Court, see
Manne, supra note 25, at 488-90.
75. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-12,999, supra note 71.
76. See, eg., Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 031191026
(Mar. 8, 1991) (proposal regarding plan to reduce toxic chemical emissions).
77. See, eg., McDonald's Corp., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB)
# 031389013 (Mar. 3, 1989) (proposal that company take steps to encourage the development of
more humane farming techniques).
78. See Philip Morris Cos., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 043090009
(Mar. 14, 1990); Kimberly-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB)
# 022690035 (Feb. 22, 1990); American Brands, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries
(WSB) # 022690034 (Feb. 22, 1990).
79. See NYC Employees' Retirement Sys. v. American Brands, 634 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (affirmative action proposal dealing with employment policies in Northern Ireland plant); cf.
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considerable economic importance, but which lack social policy implica-
tions, have often been held excludable.80 Thus, even assuming that the
Securities and Exchange Commission's current position on shareholder
proposals is an accurate reflection of state corporation law, the share-
holders' power to make precatory proposals regarding business matters is
still severely limited. Moreover, any power that exists under state corpo-
ration law is subject to legal constraints (i.e., the nonbinding character of
the resolution" and the inability of shareholders to call special meetings
at which resolutions can be adopted) 2 limiting the usefulness of that
power as a means of influencing corporate business decisions.
F. Conclusion
The powers of shareholders to influence corporate business decisions
are quite limited. Shareholders lack power under state corporation law
to adopt resolutions directing the corporation's board of directors to take
specific actions with respect to corporate property. In addition, the pow-
ers that are granted to shareholders under state corporation law-for ex-
ample, the power to elect and remove directors, the power to adopt,
amend, or repeal bylaws, the power to veto fundamental corporate
changes, and the purported power to adopt precatory resolutions-fail to
Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (proposal dealing with importation
of pitE de foie gras).
80. For example, until 1990, the SEC staff regularly permitted management to exclude share-
holder proposals relating to anti-takeover devices such as golden parachutes (i.e., contracts provid-
ing for generous payments to managers in connection with changes in control or other extraordinary
events closely associated with changes in control). See, eg., Georgia-Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 022988026 (Feb. 22, 1988); Crown Zellerbach Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 030386047 (Feb. 20, 1986); Phillips Petroleum Co., SEC
No-Action Letter Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 013084020 (Jan. 20, 1984). The Securities and Ex-
change Commission staff, however, has recently changed its position on shareholder proposals relat-
ing to golden-parachutes for firm managers. See Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter Ind. &
Summaries (WSB) # 012290009 (Jan. 10, 1990). But while the Commission staff has been more
generous in allowing shareholder proposals relating to anti-takeover devices like golden parachutes,
it continues to permit the exclusion of proposals relating to other business matters, such as employee
compensation, see, e.g., MCI Communications Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter Ind. & Summa-
ries (WSB) # 031191028 (Mar. 7, 1991); Pinnacle West Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter Ind.
& Summaries, (WSB) # 040290021 (Mar. 23, 1990); Bell Atlantic Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
Ind. & Summaries (WSB) # 122187017 (Dec. 16, 1987), and product design, see, e.g., General
Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 1, 1982) (proposal requesting company to design and
develop new engine).
81. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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function effectively as substitutes for a general power to direct corporate
affairs.
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BAR ON SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
IN MANAGEMENT
Standard explanations for corporate law rules that limit shareholder
influence over corporate decisionmaking focus on the economic function
of the corporate form-facilitating the specialization of the economic
functions of owning and managing-and the collective action problems
that arise when each shareholder owns only a small fraction of a corpora-
tion's stock. This Part explores in greater detail the standard explana-
tions for the rules limiting shareholder participation in business
decisions.
The commentary in Part II is divided into two sub-parts: Sub-Part A
sets forth and critiques the traditional explanations for rules limiting
shareholder powers. Sub-Part B considers variations on the standard ex-
planations that are designed to address the shortcomings of the tradi-
tional approaches.
A. Traditional Justification for Limitations on Shareholder Voice
As the first commentator to subject the corporate form to a systematic
economic analysis, Dean Henry Manne was not surprised to find that
modem corporation statutes failed to give shareholders a meaningful
voice in corporate affairs.83 In his view, limitations on shareholder voice
were entirely consistent with the economic function of the public corpo-
ration: the creation of a business form that facilitated passive investment
by specializing the economic functions of owning and managing.84
Although Dean Manne recognized that the separation of ownership and
control created a potential danger that managers would act to further
their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders, he argued.
that the market for corporate control provided a strong incentive for
management to operate corporations efficiently.85
More recent scholarship-most notably that of Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel 86-adopts a slightly different view of rules limiting
83. Manne, supra note 10, at 261.
84. Id. See also Demsetz, supra note 11, at 383.
85. Manne, supra note 10, at 265-66; see also Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
86. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12.
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shareholder control over business decisions. Judge Easterbrook and Pro-
fessor Fischel's analysis suggests that the costs of specializing the eco-
nomic functions of owning and managing could be reduced if
shareholders retained some voting rights on business matters.8 7 Begin-
ning with the proposition that contracting costs make it impossible for
shareholders to write contracts that cover all contingencies which may
arise during a corporation's life,"8 Easterbrook and Fischel contend that
shareholder voting provides a means by which shareholders can fill the
gaps in their contract with management.8 9 By retaining authority to
complete the corporate contract, shareholders reduce the likelihood that
management will use the powers granted to them to advance their own
interests at the shareholders' expense. In other words, shareholder vot-
ing provides a means by which shareholders can reduce the agency costs
that are inherent in the separation of shareholder ownership from man-
agement control. 9°
Although Easterbrook and Fischel recognize that shareholder voice in
business decisions arguably plays a role in limiting agency costs in public
corporations, they emphasize that the role of shareholder voice is quite
limited. Their conclusion is based upon two factual premises regarding
public corporations: first, that public corporations are comprised of
thousands of shareholders, each owning a small fraction of the corpora-
tion's stock; and second, that public corporations are subject to powerful
market constraints, especially the market for corporate control identified
by Dean Manne, that perform the same economic function as share-
holder voting-limiting the likelihood that managers will further their
own interests at the shareholders' expense.9" The first premise means
shareholders are unlikely to want to influence corporate affairs, except in
unusual instances where the expected benefits of their actions are great.
This shareholder reluctance occurs because the shareholders leading the
87. Id. See also Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the
Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985) (arguing that corporate laws which give sharehold-
ers a larger voice in corporate affairs may reduce the costs of specializing ownership and manage-
ment in some firms).
88. For a discussion of the costs involved in writing detailed contracts, see Smith & Warner,
supra note 13.
89. Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 12, at 401-02.
90. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior.
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
91. Other market constraints on managerial misconduct include product markets, capital mar-
kets, and the market for corporate managers.
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effort to influence corporate actions bear the lion's share of the costs, 92
but receive only a pro rata share of the benefits that accrue to the corpo-
ration if the effort succeeds.93 The second premise means that the in-
stances in which shareholder efforts to influence corporate affairs will
involve sufficiently large expected gains are likely to be rare. This rarity
occurs because other market mechanisms, such as the market for corpo-
rate control,94 keep management from long ignoring opportunities that
will substantially increase the value of the corporation to its sharehold-
ers. Therefore, if shareholders are motivated solely by a desire to in-
crease the economic value of their investment, shareholder efforts to
influence corporate affairs are unlikely to occur with great frequency, if
at all.
Accordingly, rules that limit shareholder power to control corporate
business decisions do not trouble Easterbrook and Fischel. Easterbrook
and Fischel conclude that shareholders might rationally delegate their
right to control business decisions to directors because shareholders un-
derstand that the board of directors make decisions more quickly and at
a lower cost than can shareholders. Shareholders realize that sharehold-
ers' meetings not only take time to organize, but also involve high costs.
The corporation must, among other things, draft, print and distribute
proxy statements prior to the meeting; hold the shareholders' meeting;
and tabulate the votes. Moreover, shareholders understand that, given
the existence of collective action problems, as well as other mechanisms
92. The shareholder seeking to influence a corporation's affairs must bear the lion's share of the
costs involved in the effort because the minority shareholders have little to gain if the effort succeeds,
and, therefore, have little incentive to investigate the merits of the particular course of action in
question on their own.
93. These collective action problems are limited, to some extent, by corporate law rules which
allow, but do not require, corporations to reimburse expenses incurred by proponents of shareholder
initiatives, provided that the initiative involves a question of corporate policy and the expenses are
reasonable. See, eg., Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). As a practical matter, however, corpora-
tions never exercise their discretionary power to reimburse shareholder proponents for costs in-
curred in connection with unsuccessful initiatives and, in fact, some doubt exists as to whether
reimbursement in such a case is proper. See Steinberg, 90 F. Supp. at 607-08; Rosenfeld, 128 N.E.2d
at 293. Accordingly, existing legal rules, which do not provide for reimbursement to shareholder
proponents in all cases, do not completely overcome problems of collective shareholder action. For
a comprehensive analysis of the rules governing reimbursement of expenses in proxy contests, see
Lucian A. Bebchuck & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy
Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1990).
94. See supra note 91; see also Baysinger & Butler, supra note 87, at 181 (explaining that the
optimal mix of mechanisms to control agency costs varies "in response to the relative effectiveness of
each mechanism under the particular firm's circumstances").
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that prevent management's interests from diverging too far from the
shareholders' interests, shareholder voting would have a function only in
extreme instances. In most instances, shareholders who own only a small
stake in the corporation would simply follow management's recommen-
dations without conducting an independent investigation. As Easter-
brook and Fischel conclude, "[w]hen many are entitled to vote, none of
the voters expects his votes to decide the contest [and c]onsequently none
of the voters has the appropriate incentive at the margin to study the
firm's affairs and vote intelligently."95
Despite extensive treatment by scholars, the standard explanations for
rules limiting shareholder participation in management are not complete.
These explanations show why shareholders could ordinarily be expected
to delegate most business decisions to management. However, as Profes-
sor Gordon recently noted, the traditional explanations fail to show why
the delegation would be absolute.96 Stated otherwise, the standard views
fail to show why shareholders would not retain the power to revoke the
delegation to management when a particular shareholder (or group of
shareholders) could establish that the owners of a majority of the corpo-
ration's shares (or such greater percentage as may be stated in the corpo-
ration's charter or bylaws) agreed that shareholders, as a group, would
be better off if the corporation followed a different business strategy than
the approach advocated by management.
For instance, a shareholders' role in the management of the corpora-
tion is arguably consistent with Dean Manne's analysis of the public cor-
poration. As noted earlier, Dean Manne views the corporation as a
device for specializing the economic functions of owning and managing.
However, no a priori reason exists to reject the possibility that the costs
of specializing the functions of owning and managing might be reduced if
shareholders retained concurrent (albeit infrequently exercised) power to
make business decisions. Accordingly, a role for shareholders in corpo-
rate management may well be consistent with Dean Manne's view.
The possibility that shareholder activism may decrease the costs of do-
95. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 402. Indeed, given the limited utility of share-
holder voting when share ownership is widely dispersed, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that share-
holder voting rights in publicly held corporations can only be explained in terms of the market for
corporate control-i.e., that shareholder voting rights are important because they enable those who
acquire control of the corporation's common stock to exercise control over the firm. Id.; see also
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Dutie" A Response to the Anti-Con-
tractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 25 (1990).
96. Gordon, supra note 19, at 354.
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ing business in the corporate form is demonstrated by research con-
ducted by Barry Baysinger and Henry Butler.9 7 Baysinger and Butler
analyzed the effect of management decisions regarding the selection of a
jurisdiction for incorporation. In particular, they examined factors that
encourage some firms to select jurisdictions of incorporation that provide
for greater involvement of shareholders in managing the firm, while
others select jurisdictions of incorporation that provide for lesser share-
holder involvement in managing the firm. In the sample of firms studied,
Baysinger and Butler found that firm performance did not vary based on
management's decision regarding the jurisdiction of incorporation. This
conclusion suggests that some firms benefit from rules facilitating share-
holder activism. Thus, Baysinger and Butler's research confirms the
existence of a "logical role for shareholder activism" in reducing the
costs of doing business in the corporate form.98
Similarly, a role for shareholders in corporate business decisions may
be consistent with Easterbrook and Fischel's analysis. As noted earlier,
Easterbrook and Fischel's analysis of limitations on shareholder voting
rights focuses on the expense of shareholder voting and on collective ac-
tion problems that arise when each shareholder owns only a small frac-
tion of the corporation's stock. This analysis clearly shows that
shareholders cannot be expected to exercise power to control business
decisions in many instances; however, it says nothing about whether
shareholders should be permitted to direct corporate action in the rare
instance where the benefits of an alternative course of action are suffi-
ciently large so that shareholder initiatives are economically feasible.
Clearly, as a theoretical matter, some business decisions may involve the
possibility of sufficiently large gains or losses for the corporation to make
shareholder activism rational, at least for shareholders owning a suffi-
ciently large stake in the firm.9 9 Thus, the conclusion that shareholders
97. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 87.
98. Id. at 191.
99. In connection with their discussion of shareholder voting on fundamental corporate
changes, Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge that some business decisions may involve the possi-
bility of sufficiently large gains and losses to make shareholder activism rational, at least for share-
holders owning a large stake in the firm. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 415-16. However,
Easterbrook and Fischel fail to explain why instances in which shareholder activism is rational are
limited to those transactions that fit within the category of "fundamental corporate changes" under a
particular state's corporate law. It is not difficult to find examples of business decisions having
dramatic economic consequences that fail to qualify as "fundamental corporate changes." Similarly,
it is not difficult to find instances of transactions that qualify as "fundamental corporate changes"
that have little economic significance. Moreover, as was noted earlier, see supra notes 53-54 and
[Vol. 70:755
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/3
1992] SHAREHOLDER VOICE: MARKET FOR CONTROL
may further their interests by retaining concurrent authority over corpo-
rate business decisions appears consistent with Easterbrook and Fischel's
economic analysis of shareholder voting.
B. Additional Explanations for Limitations on Shareholder Voice
Rules that limit shareholder power to influence corporate affairs, then,
cannot be based solely upon the conclusion that the limited benefits of
shareholder activism in controlling agency costs make shareholder efforts
to influence corporate affairs unlikely." Instead, rules limiting share-
accompanying text, transactions which qualify as fundamental corporate changes can often be re-
structured so as to escape that characterization without significantly altering the economic
substance.
100. Indeed, some who have examined the role of institutional shareholders in the modem cor-
poration challenge the traditional view that the benefits of shareholder activism are limited. See
Black, supra note 18, at 567; see also Eisenberg, supra note 18. Most notably, Professor Black has
argued that traditional law and economics scholarship underestimates the potential benefits of share-
holder activism because such scholarship "assumes a stylized model of the large public corporation
as having thousands of shareholders, each owning a tiny fraction of its shares." Black, supra note 18,
at 567; see also Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 46-48 (arguing that corporations are largely owned by
institutional investors, not by individual investors). In fact, the evidence suggests that large publicly
held companies have had high levels of institutional ownership for some time. For instance, the New
York Stock Exchange estimated in 1967 that financial institutions other than bank trust departments
held 22.5% of all stock listed on the Exchange. See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 46 (citing NEw
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1968 FACT Boox 42 (1968)). And a more recent study on share owner-
ship estimated that institutions owned more than 42% of all corporate equity securities in 1986.
Brancato, supra note 18, at table 6. This evidence, and information showing that institutions tend to
hold substantial investments in individual companies, Black, supra note 18, at 567-68; Eisenberg,
supra note 18, at 46-48, suggests that publicly held corporations are increasingly owned by skilled
investors with significant financial stakes.
That corporations tend to be owned by skilled investors with large stakes implies an increased
probability that shareholders will seek to influence the affairs of the corporation. This increased
probability of shareholder activism results both from the higher percentage of a firm's shares owned
by a single investor and from the decreased costs of coordinating action among a smaller number of
sophisticated investors. This point can be easily illustrated with a simple example. Assume that
Corporation A is owned by 100 shareholders, each of whom has a one percent stake and none of
whom knows any of the others. Corporation B, on the other hand, is owned by 73 shareholders,
three of whom own 10% stakes and 70 of whom own one percent stakes; furthermore, the three
investors with 10% stakes are institutions that regularly coordinate their activities through an insti-
tutional investor organization. Shareholder activism is obviously more likely to occur in Corpora-
tion B. Assuming an improvement that yields a $100 benefit to the corporation, shareholder
activism is a possibility in Corporation B, provided that the three institutional investors in Corpora-
tion B believe with certainty that they can cause the corporation to take the necessary steps to secure
the benefit by making an expenditure of less than $30 (the portion of the $100 benefit that they
receive if their efforts are successful). Assuming the same $100 benefit, shareholder activism only
becomes a possibility at Corporation A if a particular shareholder believes that he can cause the
corporation to take the necessary steps to secure the benefit by making an expenditure of less than $1
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holder voice must rest upon an analysis of the costs of shareholder activ-
ism to the firm in those cases.where activism is economically feasible for
some shareholders. Accordingly, this Sub-Part examines the harms tra-
ditionally associated with rules giving shareholders the power to control
corporate business decisions. This Sub-Part concludes that the costs tra-
ditionally associated with shareholder activism fail to provide an ade-
quate explanation for existing corporate law limitations on shareholder
power to control business decisions.
L The Costs of Shareholder Activism
The cost most often cited concerns the danger of misuse of a power to
control business decisions by shareholders who have a small financial
stake in the firm.101 Such shareholders, it is argued, will not consider the
full cost of their use of the corporation's proxy machinery, since many of
the costs-such as the cost of printing shareholder proposals in the proxy
statement and the cost of communicating such proposals to other share-
holders-are borne by the corporation. Accordingly, shareholders may,
on occasion, use the corporate proxy machinery to obtain benefits for
themselves, such as publicity regarding issues of concern to the particular
shareholders, even though the corporation's cost exceeds the benefit that
the particular shareholders receive.
Shareholder social responsibility proposals are especially good exam-
ples of this phenomenon."2 Social responsibility proposals appear to of-
(1% of $100). Thus, because a much higher level of shareholder expenditures can be justified in the
case of Corporation B, shareholder efforts to influence corporate affairs are more likely to occur.
Professor Black's analysis, however, does not by itself show that shareholders will frequently seek
a voice in corporate affairs. His analysis shows that the collective action problems which contribute
to shareholder passivity may not be as great as previously thought. However, the traditional share-
holder passivity story is not based upon collective action problems alone. More fundamentally, the
shareholder passivity story rests upon the proposition that there is little reason for shareholders to
want a voice in corporate affairs. Other mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, the
product market, the market for corporate managers, and the capital markets, exist to deal with the
agency problems that increased shareholder voice seeks to address. Assuming that these market
mechanisms operate effectively, the marginal benefit in reduced agency costs that arises from in-
creased shareholder voice is likely to be small, even in cases where collective action problems can be
overcome at a low cost.
101. See Manne, supra note 25; see also George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a.8: A Study in
Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1 (1985).
102. Social responsibility proposals trace their origin to Campaign GM in 1970, where the Pro-
ject on Corporate Responsibility sponsored two proposals at General Motors. The first proposal
would have expanded the corporation's board of directors to increase the representation of minori-
ties, women, consumer advocates, community activists, and ecologists. The other proposal would
have created a Shareholder Committee for Corporate Responsibility to conduct a one-year study of a
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fer few benefits to the corporation's shareholders (other than to the
proponents of the proposal who benefit by obtaining inexpensive public-
ity), as evidenced by the fact that few social proposals receive more than
three percent of the vote.10 3 However, these proposals impose substan-
tial costs on the corporation, including costs associated with publishing
the proposal in management's proxy statement, preparing management's
response, and soliciting shareholder votes against the proposal."°4
A second cost of the rules that give shareholders greater power to in-
fluence corporation's business decisions concerns the use of that power
by shareholders owning larger stakes in the firm. Professor Gordon has
argued that an expansive power to influence corporate action will lead
"credible shareholders"-shareholders that own sufficiently large stakes
in the firm to convince other shareholders that they are motivated by a
desire to increase the firm's profitability rather than by a desire to benefit
themselves-to pursue private gains through bargaining with their fellow
shareholders. 105 This private gain seeking behavior by shareholders has
two main adverse consequences. First, it will lead the firm to pursue
courses of action which may not be in the best interests of shareholders
as a group. And second, bargaining among shareholders will lead to po-
tentially costly delays in corporate decisionmaking.10 6
An example which is based on one included in Professor Gordon's
paper clearly illustrates these costs.107 Assume that two shareholders, B
and C, each own 25% of Manufacturing Corporation's stock and that
number of issues concerning General Motors' role in society. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-
Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. Rnv. 419 (1971). In the wake of
Campaign GM, shareholders have offered social responsibility proposals on matters such as the
Arab boycott of Israel; corporate operations in South Africa, Korea, and Chile; corporate equal
opportunity employment programs; and, more recently, animal rights. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra
note 49, at 642-48.
103. For instance, Campaign GM, a well-organized effort supported by Ralph Nader, only re-
ceived 2.73% of the vote for its proposal to establish a shareholder social responsibility committee
and 2.44% of the vote for its proposal to expand the board. See Schwartz, supra note 102, at 430
(1971). However, some argue that success, alone, is not a proper measure of the benefits of social
responsibility proposals. See, eg., Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 49, at 639. These commentators
argue that indirect benefits, such as increased accountability and legitimacy of corporate managers
and the possible beneficial impact of an unsuccessful proposal on corporate behavior, must also be
taken into account. Id. at 639-48. But see Dent, supra note 101, at 16-22 (arguing that indirect
benefits are neither empirically proven nor intuitively persuasive).
104. For a discussion of some of the costs of shareholder proposals, see Dent, supra note 101, at
14-16.
105. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 376-81.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 376-77.
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the remainder of the corporation's stock is dispersed among a large
number of shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of the
corporation's shares. Manufacturing Corporation plans to open a new
factory in Cincinnati that will increase firm value by $10 million. Share-
holder B also owns a chain of retail stores in Sacramento, and if Manu-
facturing Corporation locates its new plant there, the business from the
plant's workers will increase the value of B's retailing business by
$750,000. However, the Sacramento location will be more costly for
Manufacturing Corporation and will reduce the benefit of the new plant
from $10 million to $9 million. Clearly, shareholder B would prefer the
Sacramento location, since the $750,000 gain from his retailing operation
more than offsets his $250,000 loss as a shareholder of Manufacturing
Corporation. If the decision of where to locate the new plant is put to a
shareholder vote, the shareholders will likely select Sacramento, because
shareholder B can afford to make a side payment of more than $250,000
to shareholder C to convince C to vote his 25% of Manufacturing Cor-
poration's stock for the Sacramento location.108 Thus, by allowing a
shareholder vote on the issue, the corporation may ultimately adopt a
suboptimal course of action: it may select the Sacramento location,
which provides net benefits of $9,750,000 to the corporation and its
shareholders (including shareholder B), over the Cincinnati location,
which provides net benefits of $10 million to the corporation and its
shareholders. Moreover, by allowing a shareholder vote, the firm's deci-
sion is delayed while a proxy statement is prepared and a shareholders
meeting is held.
A third cost of an expansive shareholder power to control business
decisions focuses upon the potential detrimental impact that such a
power would have on corporate decisionmaking. In particular, it is ar-
gued that shareholder voting is a poor mechanism for corporate decision-
making because of the potential for "cycling, '"109 a problem identified by
political scientists who study the mechanisms of social choice." 0 Briefly,
108. The selection of the Sacramento location is not guaranteed. First, state corporate law gen-
erally makes vote buying illegal. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 609(e) (McKinney 1991) ("A
shareholder shall not sell his vote.., to any person for any sum of money.. . ."); see also Robert C.
Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 776 (1979). Therefore, the side
payment involved in the above example would have to be effectively concealed. Second, the remain-
ing 50% of Manufacturing Corporation's stock must be dispersed among a sufficiently large number
of shareholders so that those shareholders cannot cooperate to outbid B in an auction for C's votes.
109. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 359-70.
110. See generally ORDESHOOK, supra note 63, at 56-65.
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political scientists have demonstrated that, when voters hold dissimilar
preferences, it is impossible to design voting rules short of dictatorship
that guarantee a consistent ordering of social preferences.111 For exam-
ple, if three outcomes-X, Y, and Z-are possible and there are at least
three voters, pairwise voting among alternatives may yield the following
results: X defeats Y; Y defeats Z; and Z defeats X. Applying this insight
to shareholder voting, it follows that shareholder voting may be destruc-
tive: the corporation risks paralysis because of the potential inability of
shareholders to aggregate their preferences in a consistent manner.
Finally, a fourth cost of rules that give shareholders power to control
business decisions concerns the potential for shareholder initiatives to re-
sult in greenmail payments to the proponent shareholders, rather than
increases in firm profitability.112 When faced with a shareholder initia-
tive that threatens management benefits, management will attempt to
"buy off" the proponent shareholder to prevent a vote on the initiative.
Further, management efforts to buy off proponents of shareholder initia-
tives will often succeed because the proponent shareholder is indifferent
between receiving the return for his efforts in the form of increased share
values and receiving that return in the form of cash payments. Since the
payment to the proponent shareholder comes from the corporate treas-
ury, the result of this greenmail payment is a decrease in firm value with
a corresponding decrease in the value of the shares held by the firm's
investors. The only individuals that profit from the greenmail payments
are the proponent shareholders who receive the payment and the firm's
management who succeed in averting a shareholder initiative that may
threaten their perquisites. Consequently, rules that permit shareholders
to control business decisions will themselves create opportunities for both
managerial and shareholder misconduct.
In summary, under the analysis presented in this part of the article,
rules that limit shareholder voice can be understood as a rational re-
sponse by shareholders to the costs discussed above. Although share-
holders understand that there are potential benefits from shareholder
activism, they also realize that the costs of shareholder activism are po-
tentially great. Thus, shareholders conclude that rules limiting share-
holder control of corporate business decisions advance their interests.
I 1 I KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
112. Gordon, supra note 19, at 381-84.
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2. Critique of the Costs of Shareholder Activism
The analysis presented in Sub-Part II.B. 1, while an improvement over
analyses which focus only on the limited benefits of shareholder activism,
ultimately fails to provide a sufficient basis for the existing corporate law
rules dramatically restricting the ability of shareholders to influence cor-
porate business decisions. As will be explained more fully below, the
costs of shareholder activism on which that analysis is based are over-
stated: either (1) the costs can be controlled by measures falling short of
an absolute bar on shareholder participation in management, or (2) the
costs are offset by previously unidentified benefits, or (3) the costs are
simply not that large. Thus, while the justification for rules that limit
shareholder voice offered in Sub-part II.B. 1 correctly focuses on the costs
of shareholder activism in cases where shareholder activism is actually
consistent with the interests of some shareholders, that justification can-
not provide a sufficient explanation for existing corporate law limitations.
The first cost discussed above-the danger of misuse of voting rights
by shareholders with a small financial stake in the firm-is certainly a
real cost of expansive shareholder voting rights. Shareholders undoubt-
edly use the corporation proxy machinery, on occasion, to obtain benefits
for themselves, such as publicity regarding issues of concern to them (but
possibly not to shareholders generally), even though the cost of that pub-
licity to the corporation exceeds the benefit to the particular sharehold-
ers. As noted above, shareholder social responsibility proposals provide
a case in point.1 13
The risk that shareholders with small financial stakes in the firm will
misuse voting rights, however, does not justify the broad prohibitions on
shareholder voice included in modern corporation statutes. As Professor
Gordon notes, the costs associated with this type of misuse of share-
holder voting rights are controllable by less dramatic measures." 14 For
instance, corporations could condition the shareholders' power to offer
proposals on minimum ownership requirements or could require that
shareholders who do not meet the minimum ownership requirements re-
imburse the corporation for costs incurred in connection with their pro-
posals. 5 Either of these proposals would significantly reduce the
likelihood that shareholders with small stakes in the firm would misuse
113. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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the corporate proxy machinery. Under the first proposal, small share-
holders would simply be disqualified from using the corporation's proxy
machinery; under the second proposal, small shareholders would have to
pay the full cost of the publicity obtained, thus eliminating the imbalance
between costs and benefits which creates the potential for misuse of the
corporation's proxy machinery.
The second cost of rules that give shareholders greater power to influ-
ence the firm's affairs-the costs incurred when larger "credible share-
holders" use their voting power to force the firm to adopt suboptimal
courses of action-causes greater problems. Unlike opportunistic behav-
ior by shareholders holding small stakes in the firm, opportunistic behav-
ior by shareholders with larger stakes cannot be controlled by less
dramatic means without entirely eliminating the possibility of share-
holder activism. The potential for this type of opportunistic behavior
may be decreased by strict enforcement of existing corporate law rules
that prohibit vote buying, thereby preventing the consummation of the
side deals that are necessary to secure shareholder support for subop-
timal projects. However, these efforts are unlikely to succeed because
side payments can be disguised or dispensed with entirely if shareholders
adopt a practice of supporting each others' proposals. Consequently, op-
portunistic behavior by shareholders who own large stakes in a corpora-
tion is likely to be a cost of any system that permits shareholders to
influence corporate affairs.
Nonetheless, opportunistic behavior by shareholders owning larger
stakes in the firm does not necessarily justify rules limiting shareholder
voice. True, as Professor Gordon notes, rules that permit shareholders
to influence corporate affairs will allow shareholders to pursue private
gains through bargaining and, therefore, may lead firms to undertake
suboptimal projects.' 16 However, Professor Gordon's analysis ignores
the fact that shareholders as a group may benefit in some cases from such
private gain seeking behavior.
As an illustration, assume that two shareholders, B and C, each own
25% of Manufacturing Corporation's stock and that the remaining stock
is dispersed among a large number of shareholders. The value of Manu-
facturing Corporation can be increased by $1 million by moving its fac-
tory from Cincinnati to Sacramento. However, Manufacturing
Corporation's managers who are all life-long Cincinnati residents oppose
116. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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the move. As in the example discussed in Sub-Part II.B.1, assume fur-
ther that shareholder B owns a chain of retail stores in Sacramento. If
Manufacturing Corporation locates its new plant in Sacramento, the
business from the plant's workers will increase the value of B's retailing
business by $750,000. Because shareholder B will receive a $750,000
gain from his retailing operations and a $250,000 gain as a shareholder of
Manufacturing Corporation, he is willing to spend up to $1 million to
convince his fellow shareholders to support the move to Sacramento. In
contrast, shareholder C, who has no opportunity for private gain, is only
willing to spend $250,000-his pro rata portion of the $1 million benefit
that accrues to the corporation-to convince other shareholders to sup-
port the move. Since B can capture private benefits by causing Manufac-
turing Corporation to move to Sacramento, such a move-a step
beneficial to shareholders as a group-is more likely to occur.
Thus, the opportunity for shareholders to capture private benefits can
make shareholder voice a more effective tool for monitoring manage-
ment. This result, however, should not be surprising. One of the princi-
pal limitations on shareholder voice as a check on agency costs inherent
in public corporations concerns the problem of collective shareholder ac-
tion: shareholders who seek to influence the corporation's affairs bear the
lion's share of the cost of the effort, but receive only a pro rata portion of
the benefits. The receipt by these shareholders of private gains offsets
this imbalance between costs incurred and benefits received. Therefore,
shareholder voice becomes a more effective vehicle for monitoring man-
agement. Indeed, shareholders' private gains can be understood as a
form of compensation for the increased monitoring of management that
shareholders owning larger stakes provide.
Thus, voting rules that facilitate private gain seeking behavior by
shareholders who own larger stakes in the firm are not necessarily detri-
mental to the firm. No a priori reason exists to believe that shareholders
will be unwilling to absorb the costs of suboptimal projects in exchange
for the benefits of increased monitoring of management by large share-
holders. In fact, pointing to the corporate law of fiduciary duties, many
argue that shareholders have already made precisely this tradeoff in con-
nection with the operation of the market for corporate control.' 17 Cor-
porate law fiduciary standards generally permit controlling shareholders
117. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Prob-
lern, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980).
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to cause the corporation to engage in transactions that maximize their
private gains, subject only to the constraint that no investor is made
worse off by the transaction."tt Such rules permit controlling sharehold-
ers to cause corporations to engage in transactions that benefit them-
selves, despite the fact that alternative courses of action would have
provided minority shareholders with greater gains. However, minority
shareholders are willing to absorb these losses because the ability of con-
trolling shareholders to keep the gains that result from their managerial
efforts following a takeover makes takeovers more profitable and, there-
fore, more likely to occur. The result is more vigorous monitoring of
management by the market for corporate control.
The third cost of rules that give shareholders expansive voting rights-
the potential for shareholder voting to reveal a cyclic ordering of share-
holder preferences (i.e. "cycling")t-also fails to provide an adequate
basis for rules limiting shareholder voice in corporate business decisions.
Preference cycling is possible only when at least three groups of voters
hold dissimilar preferences. 120 Thus, for a preference cycling problem to
exist, there must be a sufficient number of issues on which at least three
groups of shareholders are likely to hold distinct views.
An analysis of shareholder voting shows that issues dividing share-
holders into three or more separate factions are unlikely to arise with
great frequency. Because most shareholders share a common goal-to
maximize the firm's value-the range of disagreement among sharehold-
ers should be relatively narrow. Most shareholders will attempt to order
alternatives based upon the returns to the firm generated by the particu-
lar project or business strategy. Therefore, chances are good that share-
holders will order alternatives in the same fashion. Since shareholders
are unlikely to hold distinct views on a significant number of issues, pref-
erence cycling is unlikely to be a significant concein in the context of
shareholder voting.
Some shareholders may, of course, have special concerns regarding
particular business strategies under consideration by the firm. For in-
stance, shareholders who are also employees of the firm may be worried
118, See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("Self-dealing occurs
when the parent by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a
way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the
minority stockholders of the subsidiary.") (emphasis added).
119. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
120. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 63, at 56-60.
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about the impact of the particular business strategy on their level of com-
pensation or on their job security. In addition, some shareholders may
have large investments in other businesses which may be significantly
affected by the firm's decision on a particular matter. 21 However, these
sources of differing preferences among shareholders are unlikely to result
in a significant amount of cycling in shareholder voting. First, instances
in which particular business decisions have special effects on employee
shareholders or other shareholder groups are likely to be rare. Most or-
dinary business decisions, such as the decision to construct a new factory
or develop a new product, will not threaten employee compensation or
job security or offer shareholder groups opportunities to capture private
gains. Second, differing preferences that arise from the special interests
of particular sub-groups of shareholders are unlikely to divide sharehold-
ers into a large number of sub-groups. It is difficult to find examples of
issues that divide shareholders into more than three or four groups-i.e.,
managers, one or two groups of shareholders who may be specially af-
fected by the firm's decision, and the remaining shareholders who care
only about the market value of their shares. Where the number of voting
groups is small, the probability that pairwise voting among alternatives
will reveal a cycle of preference orders is low, ranging from five percent
when there are three shareholder groups and three alternatives to ap-
proximately thirteen percent when there are four shareholder groups and
four alternatives.1 2 These percentages appear insufficient to justify dra-
matic limitations on shareholder voting rights.
However, the view that shareholders are a relatively homogenous
group that share similar investment goals has been challenged. Some
contend that differing shareholder preferences as to time of payout and
risk level could lead groups of shareholders to consistently prefer differ-
ent business strategies than other groups. 123 For example, Professor
Gordon notes that a shareholder who needs a payout in an early period
may vote for project A, even though project B, which provides for a later
payout, maximizes the market value of the firm's shares. 24 Thus, in Pro-
121. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
122. See ORDESHOOIC, supra note 63, at 58. The percentages set forth in the text are based upon
the assumption that all orderings of preferences are equally likely for each issue under consideration
by a body of voters. This assumption may not be valid in the corporate context since shareholder
groups are likely to have similar preferences on many issues. Thus, the percentages referred to in the
text may well overestimate the likelihood of cycling in corporate decisionmaking.
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fessor Gordon's view, since shareholders cannot be considered a homoge-
neous group, preference cycling in shareholder voting cannot be
dismissed as an oddity that arises only in isolated instances.
Professor Gordon's concerns regarding the potential for cycling in
shareholder voting, however, are not well founded. Shareholders can be
expected to have similar expectations regarding the firm's perform-
ance. 125 Differences in shareholder expectations should be eliminated by
mutually beneficial trades between investors in a firm's shares: investors
who desire or expect a firm to pursue a strategy which fails to maximize
the market value of the firm's shares can be expected to sell their shares
to investors with more optimistic expectations. 126 But even assuming
that individual shareholders have differing preferences regarding factors
such as time of payout and risk level, shareholders are still likely to be a
reasonably homogeneous group with respect to their desires for the firm.
They will generally find it in their best interest to select a course of action
that maximizes the market value of their shares, without regard to time
of payout or risk level associated with the particular project or business
strategy. Differing preferences regarding the timing of payout or the
level of risk can be handled by trading in securities markets. For exam-
ple, shareholders that favor an earlier payout can obtain that payout by
selling their shares at the desired time or by borrowing. Shareholders
that fear the risk associated with a particular business strategy can re-
duce their exposure to that risk by selling shares short or by investing in
a diversified portfolio. Although these investment strategies involve
some cost to investors, in most cases the cost will not be so high as to
lead investors to prefer a business strategy that fails to maximize the
market value of their shares. Therefore it appears unlikely that the po-
tential for cycling in shareholder voting is very great. Accordingly, the
potentially destructive impact of cycling does not appear to provide an
adequate basis for rules limiting the shareholders' ability to control cor-
porate business decisions.
The fourth cost of rules that give shareholders greater power to con-
trol corporate business decisions-the danger that the power will result
in greenmail payments-suffers the same fate as the three costs consid-
125. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961); Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price
Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972); see also Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 117, at 726-27.
126. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 727.
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ered above. Managers may attempt to buy off shareholder proponents
where the initiative threatens managerial perquisites. However, it is un-
likely that greenmail payments will occur with sufficient frequency and
magnitude to offset the benefits that flow from a power of shareholder
initiative. First, greenmail payments can be challenged as breaches of
managerial fiduciary duties under state corporate law. 127 Second, share-
holders can freely draft anti-greenmail provisions into the corporate
charter or bylaws. Furthermore, an argument against shareholder pow-
ers based upon the potential for greenmail payments proves too much.
Many mechanisms for controlling managerial misconduct can be avoided
by managers who are determined to protect their perquisites. For in-
stance, managers can erect takeover barriers that decrease shareholder
wealth; but no one argues that the existence of these tactics means that
takeovers should be banned. Without more, there appears to be little
reason to conclude that the potential for greenmail payments provides
any greater basis for rules that limit shareholder power to control corpo-
rate business decisions.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR LIMITATIONS ON SHAREHOLDER VOICE
The standard explanations for rules that limit shareholder voice fail to
provide an adequate basis for rules limiting shareholder voice in manage-
ment. Although these explanations show why shareholders would ordi-
narily delegate the power to make business decisions to the corporation's
officers and directors, they fail to show why shareholders would not re-
tain concurrent (albeit infrequently exercised) authority over business de-
cisions. This Part addresses the shortcoming of these traditional
explanations by showing how rules that limit the ability of shareholders
to control corporate business decisions facilitate the primary economic
function of the public corporation-the specialization of the economic
functions of owning and managing. This section argues that rules limit-
ing shareholder control of a corporation's business affairs are necessary
to insure the efficient operation of organized securities exchanges and the
market for corporate control.
A. The Economic Function of the Public Corporation
People can organize business activities in a variety of forms, such as
127. Cf. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988) (plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to
state cause of action based upon corporation's stock repurchase).
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sole proprietorships, general partnerships, limited partnerships, close
corporations, or public corporations. The public corporation is particu-
larly well suited to business activities that require a combination of many
specialized skills with large amounts of capital, since the features of the
public corporation are designed, in large part, to facilitate the division of
labor.'2 ' Public corporations permit "[t]he distinct functions of manage-
rial skills and the provision of capital (and the bearing of risk)... [to] be
separated and assigned to different people-workers who lack capital,
and owners of funds who lack specialized production skills."' 29 By facil-
itating the separation of the functions of managing and owning, the pub-
lic corporation allows entrepreneurs to raise capital from a large number
of passive investors.
The market for corporate control plays a key role in the operation of
the public corporation. Because the public corporation involves the sepa-
ration of managing and owning, the owners (i.e., the shareholders) are
exposed to the risk that the managers will use their control to advance
their own interests.130 For example, managers may prefer to use the
firm's capital to furnish their offices or to purchase corporate jets, rather
than to revitalize the firm's manufacturing facilities. The market for cor-
porate control reduces the divergence between the interests of owners
and managers. If managers fail to manage the corporation efficiently, the
price of the firm's shares will fall. This decline in share price will allow
outsiders to profit by purchasing control of the firm and replacing man-
agement with a new management team that will act to maximize the
market value of the firm's shares. Thus, the market for corporate control
reduces the divergence between the interests of shareholders and manag-
ers by pressuring management to be attentive to the shareholders' princi-
pal concern-the market value of the firm's stock. The reduced
divergence between the interests of shareholders and managers decreases
the cost of capital for public corporations, since investors who are ex-
posed to a reduced risk of mismanagement will be willing to accept a
lower rate of return on their equity investments.
Organized securities exchanges also play an important role in the oper-
ation of public corporations. Because corporations are not required to
return capital to shareholders prior to dissolution of the corporation, eq-
uity investors risk being locked into undesirable investments. For in-
128. See Manne, supra note 10.
129. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 94.
130. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 90.
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stance, an equity investor's preferences may change in the future, but he
will be unable to shift his investment to match his new preferences if the
corporation refuses to redeem his shares or a ready, willing, and able
buyer cannot be located. Organized securities markets ameliorate this
concern. By making it inexpensive and easy for an investor to locate a
ready, willing, and able buyer, organized securities exchanges provide eq-
uity investors with increased liquidity, and, therefore, an increased ability
to respond to changed circumstances. The increased liquidity provided
by well functioning securities markets means lower costs of capital for
public corporations, since investors who can easily sell their shares when
their preferences change will be willing to accept a lower rate of return
than investors who cannot.
Important features of the corporate form can be understood, by the
role they play in facilitating the efficient operation of organized securities
exchanges and the market for corporate control. For example, Judge
Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have demonstrated how the smooth
operation of the market for corporate control depends upon an institu-
tion like limited liability for shareholders.131 Easterbrook and Fischel
suggest that, under a rule of unlimited liability, shares would not be fun-
gible since their "value would be a function of the present value of future
cash flows and of the wealth of shareholders." '32 This lack of fungibility
would make control transactions more difficult because a potential ac-
quiror of control would have to negotiate separately with individual
shareholders, paying each shareholder a different price. 133 Moreover, be-
cause the acquiror in a control transaction is generally wealthier than the
selling shareholders, the potential cost of forced additional capital contri-
butions that may be required under a rule of unlimited liability would be
higher to the acquiror than to the selling shareholders. Therefore, the
acquiror's ability to offer a sufficient premium over the market price to
induce existing shareholders to tender their shares would be inhibited.1 34
131. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21.
132. Id. at 96; see also Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corpo-
ration Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980).
133. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 96.
134. Id. Along the same lines, Grossman and Hart have shown how the efficient operation of
the market for corporate control is advanced by common law fiduciary duty rules that permit con-
trolling shareholders to exclude minority shareholders from sharing in the gains generated by a
takeover. Grossman & Hart, supra note 117; see also Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 117. In
particular, Grossman and Hart focus on corporate law fiduciary standards that permit controlling
shareholders to cause the corporation to engage in transactions that maximize the private gains
received by the controlling shareholders, subject only to the constraint that no minority shareholder
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Similarly, Easterbrook and Fischel have illustrated how a rule of lim-
ited liability contributes to the smooth operation of organized securities
exchanges.' 35 Without a rule of limited liability, Easterbrook and Fis-
chel argue that shares would not have one market price because the value
of each share would be dependent upon the wealth of its owner. Since
shares would no longer have one market price, investors would not be
able to rely upon a single market price in making investment decisions.
Instead, investors would have to devote greater resources to analyzing
the value of the firm to determine the right price for the shares being
offered. These increased investor expenditures in a world without limited
liability would mean diminished liquidity for equity investors and there-
fore a higher cost of capital for public corporations. With limited liabil-
ity, however, organized securities exchanges operate more efficiently.
Investors can rely on a single market price in buying and selling securi-
ties. Moreover, this price will impound additional information about the
value of the firm since, "[w]hen all can trade on the same terms, ...
investors trade until the price of shares reflects the available information
about a firm's prospects."' 36
B. The Economic Rationale for Limitations on Shareholder Voice
Similar to limited liability, rules that limit the shareholders' ability to
control corporate business decisions can be understood by the role they
play in facilitating the efficient operation of securities exchanges and of
the market for corporate control. This Sub-Part explores the link be-
tween rules limiting shareholder voice, on the one hand, and the market
for corporate control and organized securities exchanges, on the other.
is made worse off by the transaction. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971). Such rules permit controlling shareholders to cause corporations to engage in transactions
that benefit controlling shareholders, notwithstanding the fact that alternative courses of action
would have provided minority shareholders with greater gains. Grossman and Hart contend, how-
ever, that shareholders are willing to accept the losses associated with these transactions because the
ability of controlling shareholders to keep the gains that result from their management efforts follow-
ing a takeover makes takeovers more profitable. In other words, fiduciary duty principles that per-
mit controlling shareholders to adopt devices to exclude minority shareholders from sharing in the
gains generated by a takeover prevent minority shareholders from free riding on the efforts of the
control acquiror and therefore increase the likelihood of successful takeovers which benefit the cor-
poration and all the shareholders.
135. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 96.
136. Id.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
794 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
1. The Relationship of Shareholder Voice and the Market for
Corporate Control
Rules that limit shareholder power to control corporate business deci-
sions facilitate the efficient operation of the market for corporate control
in two ways. First, rules limiting shareholder voice decrease transaction
costs involved with acquisitions of control by eliminating the need for
acquirors to negotiate separately with individual shareholders. As an il-
lustration, consider a world in which shareholders have the power to pro-
pose binding resolutions on any subject at any time. In such a world,
shareholders would have an incentive to pursue private gains through
bargaining with their fellow shareholders; 37 shareholders could be ex-
pected to make side payments to, or enter into reciprocal arrangements
with, their fellow shareholders in the hopes of causing the firm to take
actions that would generate private gains. Therefore, share value would
be a function of the present value of the firm's cash flows and of the
expected value of any private benefits that a shareholder may receive as a
result of his relationship with the firm. The amount of private gains that
a shareholder could expect would vary depending upon the nature of the
shareholder's other business activities. The closer the relationship be-
tween the firm's activities and the shareholder's other business ventures,
the greater the potential for the shareholder to capture private gains and,
consequently, the greater the value that the shareholder would attach to
his shares. Thus, under rules that facilitate shareholder voice, an ac-
quiror of control would face the same problem that Easterbrook and Fis-
chel identified in their explanation of limited liability: the acquiror would
have to negotiate separately with individual shareholders, paying differ-
ent prices to each. Therefore, control transactions would become more
difficult. 138
Second, rules limiting shareholder voice increase the probability of a
successful takeover by decreasing the premium that a potential acquiror
must pay for control. Because the analysis of this phenomenon is some-
what complicated, an example is helpful to demonstrate the effect on the
market for corporate control.1 39 Assume a firm exists with two distinct
137. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text; see also Gordon, supra note 19, at 376-79.
138. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 95-96.
139. The analysis that follows is analogous to the analysis in Ren6 M. Stulz, Managerial Control
of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25, 28-
34 (1988). Stulz examines the effect of managerial control of voting rights on firm value and financ-
ing policies. Stulz demonstrates that an increase in the percentage of voting rights under manage-
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groups of shareholders. The first group ("rent-seeking shareholders") is
composed of individuals that have the ability to capture private gains if
they can influence the business affairs of the firm. Accordingly, under
rules that facilitate shareholder voice, the share value to a rent-seeking
shareholder is a function of the firm's expected cash flows and the value
of private gains that the shareholder expects to receive as a result of his
power to influence the firm's affairs. The second group ("disinterested
shareholders") is composed of individuals who have no capacity to cap-
ture private gains. The share value to this group is a function only of the
firm's expected cash flows. Assume further that rent-seeking sharehold-
ers will lose their power to influence the firm's affairs (and therefore suf-
fer a diminution in the value of their shares) in the event that a potential
acquiror captures control of the corporation."4
Under rules that facilitate shareholder voice, a conflict of interest ex-
ists between the two groups of shareholders. Rent-seeking shareholders
will tender their shares to a potential acquiror only if the premium of-
fered is large enough to compensate them both for their pro-rata share of
the firm's expected cash flows and for the potential private gains lost. 141
Assuming for simplicity that a potential acquiror's gain from control is
too small to enable it to pay a premium large enough to induce rent-
seeking shareholders to tender their shares, then, rent-seeking sharehold-
ers will never tender their shares to a potential acquiror. Disinterested
shareholders, however, will be amenable to tendering their shares for a
smaller premium than rent-seeking shareholders, since disinterested
shareholders only require compensation for their pro-rata portion of the
firm's expected cash flows. Thus, situations may arise where disinter-
ment's control decreases the possibility of a successful tender offer and increases the premium that
must be paid.
140. This assumption appears reasonable. First, shareholders who capture control of a firm gen-
erally follow their acquisition of control with a cash-out merger (i.e., a merger in which minority
shareholders are forced to accept cash for their shares). Thus, a rent-seeking shareholder would not
be likely to continue to be a stockholder in the firm following a control transaction. Even assuming
that a cash-out merger did not occur, a minority shareholder is not likely to be able to successfully
influence the firm's affairs following a control transaction, since a shareholder who owns 51% of a
firm's shares is unlikely to agree with schemes that benefit a minority shareholder at the expense of
the firm.
141. This analysis assumes that rent-seeking shareholders must make firm-specific investments
in order to obtain private benefits from influencing the firm's affairs. If rent-seeking shareholders
could obtain private benefits without making firm-specific investments, they would not insist on
compensation for the private benefits lost when an acquiror captures control. In that case, a rent-
seeking shareholder could obtain private gains by selling his shares and investing in a different firm
where private gains remained available.
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ested shareholders would be willing to tender their shares, but rent-seek-
ing shareholders would not.
Under these conditions, if a takeover attempt is to succeed, a potential
acquiror must acquire a controlling stake solely from disinterested share-
holders. When no shares are owned by rent-seeking shareholders, this
task is relatively easy. Using his knowledge regarding the upward slop-
ing supply curve for shares owned by disinterested shareholders, 42 the
potential acquiror selects the lowest premium that will induce disinter-
ested shareholders to tender fifty-one percent of their shares. However,
as the percentage of shares owned by rent-seeking shareholders increases,
the potential acquiror's task becomes more difficult. Now the potential
acquiror must induce disinterested shareholders to tender a larger per-
centage of their shares (equal to at least 1/[2(1-a)] where cc equals the
percentage of shares owned by rent-seeking shareholders) in order for the
offer to succeed. Because the supply curve for shares owned by disinter-
ested shareholders increases, the potential acquiror must therefore in-
crease the premium offered to induce the disinterested shareholders to
tender the larger fraction of their shares. Thus, under rules that facilitate
shareholder voice, an increase in the percentage of shares owned by rent-
seeking shareholders increases the premium which the potential acquiror
must offer in order to acquire at least 51% of the shares. Takeovers
therefore become less profitable for potential acquirors and, hence, less
likely to occur. 143
142. For a general discussion of empirical and theoretical evidence suggesting that the supply
curve of shares tendered is an increasing function of the premium offered by a potential acquiror, see
Stulz, supra note 139, at 29-30. Briefly, empirical evidence on the upward slope of the supply curve
for shares includes evidence of bids that are oversubscribed. See Michael Bradely et al., The Ration-
ale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECoN. 183 (1983). It also
includes evidence that the number of shares purchased in share repurchases increases with the pre-
mium offered, see, eg., Ronald W. Masulis, Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the
Causes of Common Stock Price Changes, 35 J. FIN. 305 (1980), and evidence that the probability of
success of a tender offer increases with the premium offered, see Ralph A. Walkling, Predicting
Tender Offer Success A Logistic Analysis, 20 J, FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 461 (1985). Theoretical
justifications for the upward slope of the supply curve for shares include the differing income tax
impact of a cash tender offer on differently situated shareholders. See Stulz, supra note 139, at 30.
143. The foregoing analysis assumed a situation in which a potential acquiror's gain from con-
trol was too small to enable it to pay a premium large enough to induce rent-seeking shareholders to
tender their shares. The conclusion-that an increase in the fraction of shares owned by rent-seek-
ing shareholders increases the premium which must be offered in order for a potential acquiror to
capture control--does not, however, rest on that assumption. For a detailed discussion of the math-
ematical steps necessary to generalize this analysis, see Stulz, supra note 139, at 36-40 (analyzing the
effect of managerial control of voting rights).
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Stated otherwise, under rules facilitating shareholder voice, sharehold-
ers who have the capacity to capture private benefits by influencing the
corporation's affairs begin to resemble firm managers. Like firm manag-
ers, these shareholders make firm-specific investments to maximize the
benefits that they receive as a result of their affiliation with the firm.
Moreover, these shareholders resist efforts by potential acquirors that
threaten to render these firm-specific investments valueless by refusing to
tender their shares (or at least holding out for a price that is sufficiently
high to compensate them for the value of their firm-specific investments).
Not surprisingly, the result of resistance by these shareholders is identi-
cal to the result of resistance by firm managers: an increase in the cost of
tender offers to potential acquirors and a corresponding reduction in the
effectiveness of the market for corporate control. 144
2. Relationship Between Rules Limiting Shareholder Voice and the
Operation of Securities Exchanges
In addition to contributing to the efficient operation of the market for
corporate control, rules limiting shareholder voice contribute to the effi-
cient operation of organized securities exchanges. Without rules that
limit shareholder voice, shares would not have a single market price; the
value of a share would partially depend on the expected value of any
private gains that a particular shareholder could expect to receive as a
result of his relationship with the firm. Since shares would no longer
have a single market price, investors would have to expend greater re-
sources analyzing the firm's value before trading. These greater expendi-
tures would mean diminished liquidity for investors and an increased
cost of capital for firms. However, under rules that limit shareholder
voice, these impediments to the smooth operation of securities markets
do not exist. Investors can trade in reliance on a market price which
impounds all available information. Therefore, rules that limit share-
holder voice have the same beneficial impact on organized securities ex-
changes as rules limiting the liability of shareholders.
3. A Final Caveat
The above analysis illustrates that rules limiting the ability of share-
holders to control business decisions may increase shareholder wealth in
some firms; however, it should not be construed to suggest that rules
144. See Stulz, supra note 139.
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limiting shareholder voice are appropriate for all firms. The above analy-
sis implies that a tradeoff exists between market and voice mechanisms
for controlling agency costs inherent in the structure of the public corpo-
ration. On the one hand, legal rules limiting shareholder participation in
management invigorate the market for corporate control by making take-
overs less expensive. On the other hand, legal rules facilitating share-
holder participation in management invigorate the voice method of
monitoring management by providing shareholders that engage in active
monitoring with the power to capture private gains. Therefore, since the
evidence suggests that different mixes of monitoring methods are appro-
priate for different firms,' 4 5 the proper legal rule regarding shareholder
voice in management should vary depending upon the firm's
characteristics.
One way to test the theory advanced in this article would be to ex-
amine the legal rules relating to shareholder voice in a large sample of
public corporations. Controlling for all other variables one would expect
to find that firms with the greatest profit potential from active share-
holder oversight would more often be characterized by rules giving
shareholders a greater role in management decisions. As Demsetz and
Lehn note in another context, 146 firms where the profit potential from
shareholder activism is the greatest could be identified by virtue of the
noisiness of the environment in which they operate. One would therefore
expect firms that operate in less stable environments (i.e., environments
not characterized by stable prices, technology, or market share) to benefit
more from active shareholder oversight. 147
145. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 87; Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of
Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985). Baysinger and Butler examine
the factors that lead firms to choose between jurisdictions with strict and liberal corporate laws;
Demsetz and Lehn, on the other hand, examine the factors that lead different firms to have different
levels of concentration of ownership of equity securities. These studies present evidence that firm
performance does not vary depending upon the jurisdiction of incorporation (in the case of the
Baysinger and Butler study) or the level of concentration in share ownership (in the case of the
Demsetz and Lehn study). Therefore, these studies support the conclusion that different monitoring
mechanisms are appropriate for different types of firms.
146. Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 145, at 1159.
147. Id. It should be noted, however, that a finding that few public corporations have rules
giving shareholders a significant voice in management would not necessarily undermine the theory
set forth in this paper. Perhaps the market for corporate control and organized securities exchanges
are of such importance to the efficient operation of public corporations that it is almost never in the
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CONCLUSION
This article has examined the economic impact of rules limiting the
power of shareholders to influence corporate business decisions. In par-
ticular, this Article contends that rules limiting shareholder voice cannot
be based solely upon the conclusion that shareholders will rarely wish to
play an active role in the firm's affairs. Instead, rules limiting share-
holder voice must rest upon an analysis of the costs of shareholder activ-
ism to the firm in those few cases where activism is consistent with the
interests of some of the firm's shareholders. Reasoning that rules facili-
tating shareholder activism reduce the efficiency of both the market for
corporate control and organized securities exchanges, this article con-
cludes that limitations on shareholder voice may increase shareholder
wealth in some firms by decreasing the costs of specializing the economic
functions of owning and managing.
The analysis presented here has significant policy implications for the
current debate surrounding the appropriate role of institutional share-
holders in corporate governance. The analysis suggests that changes to
corporation laws designed to facilitate monitoring of corporate managers
by increasing shareholder influence over business decisions should only
be undertaken with caution. Although changes designed to facilitate in-
stitutional activism will certainly increase the effectiveness of shareholder
monitoring of managers, these changes may inadvertently decrease the
effectiveness of a more important mechanism for controlling manage-
ment-the market for corporate control.
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